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[33 ELR 10559]
Modern federal environmental law has a built-in dynamic of tension that since its inception has led to challenging
relations between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states. On the one hand, the U.S. Congress
enacted numerous environmental statutes in the early 1970s because of widespread dissatisfaction with state efforts to
protect the environment. Congress made EPA ultimately accountable for achieving the mandates of federal law. On the
other hand, Congress contemplated that states would actually implement and enforce the requirements of these statutes,
subject to federal oversight. To a large extent, its vision has been realized; states now administer over 75% of the major
federal delegable environmental programs,1 and conduct the great majority of environmental enforcement in this
country. But as Prof. David Hodas notes, "heavy reliance on state enforcement is a double-edged sword. When we
'deputize' the states to implement national environmental laws, we shift the government's discretionary enforcement
power to state and local officials, who may not be interested in, or able to carry out, federal goals."2
The tension characterizing the federal/state enforcement relationship has, if anything, intensified in recent years,
particularly during the 1990s. Many state programs have grown and become more professional over the past two or
three decades. With this maturation, state agencies are increasingly feeling their oats. They have become dissatisfied
with a role that they perceive as EPA "dependents" or "subordinates," and increasingly insist on changing the terms of
this relationship to one of "partners." With the emergence in the 1990s of the Environmental Council of States (ECOS),
the influential lobbying group representing the environmental commissioners of 51 of the 55 states and territories, in
particular, state environmental agencies enjoy a new level of influence in Washington, D.C. State calls for devolving
more environmental authority have met with sympathetic receptions in both Congress and the executive branch.
One of the central sources of tension between EPA and the states derives from their competing visions of enforcement.
Many states disagree with EPA's traditional vision that deterrence-based enforcement must be a central part of a
government enforcement and compliance program. They contend, instead, that more flexible and regulated partyfriendly approaches are superior. They argue that carrots work better than sticks, and that states should be given more
flexibility to explore various strategies to promote compliance, rather than be locked into EPA's approach. There has
been an especially lively debate over the past 5 to 10 years over which set of strategies works better to achieve
compliance. (This debate extends well beyond simply EPA and the states.) To some extent, the distinctions between
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pure "deterrence-based" and "cooperation-based" models have been blurring in recent years. EPA, and some states,
have been increasingly utilizing tools from both schools of thought in a more integrated and strategic fashion,
experimenting with combinations of targeted enforcement, compliance assistance, and compliance incentive programs.
Nonetheless, pronounced differences in enforcement philosophy continue to exist.
As a host of studies indicate, the performance of many state enforcement programs falls substantially short of EPA's
expectations, which traditionally have been based on a deterrence-oriented model of enforcement. Many states do not
adhere to EPA guidelines for how an enforcement program should be run, e.g., guidelines governing when violations
are sufficiently serious to justify an enforcement action, and the types of sanctions that should be imposed on
significant violators. The significant gap between state performance and EPA expectations is troubling for at least three
important and related reasons. One, rates of noncompliance with environmental laws in many states remain
significant.3 [33 ELR 10560] Two, the gap is symptomatic of a lack of accountability that underlies the actual
administration of the environmental protection regulatory infrastructure. This is particularly a cause for concern when a
number of empirical studies and experience have found that deterrence-based enforcement works to promote
compliance and reduce pollution, but some states have essentially opted not to conduct deterrence-based enforcement
and either invested a lower level of resources in promoting compliance than EPA believes are needed, or are
emphasizing different approaches without documenting or, in some cases even seriously trying to document, that these
are producing desired results. Finally, while some variation among state enforcement performance and approach is
inevitable under the system of cooperative federalism that characterizes federal environmental law, when state
capabilities and performance vary too dramatically, they threaten to undermine the balance between the interests of
consistency and state autonomy that Congress struck in enacting the environmental statutes. Among other things, the
differences may create an unequal playing field for regulated entities, enabling some facilities to gain a competitive
advantage through noncompliance or less rigorous compliance in states with weak enforcement practices.4
Numerous factors contribute to the substantial divide between state performance and EPA expectations. They include
the differences between EPA and the states in their enforcement philosophies, limitations in state legal authorities and
resources, and weaknesses in the data systems of EPA and the states that have complicated efforts to monitor state
performance. EPA resource constraints have limited EPA's practical ability to influence states. EPA also has delivered
an ambiguous message to the states—and to its own regions—about federal expectations. In addition, the gap signals
flaws in EPA's system of oversight, either in theory or how it has been implemented in practice. Among other things,
the threat of EPA withdrawing authority for poorly performing states, the ultimate sanction that in theory should
motivate state conformance to EPA policy, has proven to be largely hollow, for political and resource reasons. As Prof.
William Rodgers notes, "authorization is very much a one-way street that is granted but almost never withdrawn."5
Other oversight tools, such as overfiling, also have not been particularly effective. There also has been significant
criticism from a number of quarters about the traditional criteria that EPA has used to evaluate state enforcement
programs, largely focused on agency enforcement activities. Thus, the nature of EPA oversight of state performance
warrants special attention. Invigoration, in the form of new approaches to oversight, and reworking of some existing
approaches, is needed.
The creation of the National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS) in 1995 represented an effort to
abate the tension between EPA and the states, and also, in theory, an approach that can end the gap between state
performance and EPA expectations by making the states more accountable. At its core, NEPPS promised to let states
be judged by bottomline performance—how well the states improve environmental conditions and achieve compliance.
As originally conceived, NEPPS envisioned a system of differential oversight, rewarding better performing states with
greater autonomy and flexibility, and even conferring a "leadership" status for exceptionally performing states.6
Thus far, NEPPS has not lived up to its promise, including in the enforcement/compliance area.7 Relatively few states
have developed and implemented the core performance measures that would allow EPA to judge them by bottomline
performance.8 There has been relatively little reduction in EPA oversight of states, and EPA has dropped the concept of
differential oversight, despite its potential for holding states accountable for bottomline performance and strengthening
incentives for states to improve their performance.9

NEPPS may still prove to be an effective vehicle for encouraging state performance and improving the state/federal
relationship, and it is likely to enjoy strong support from [33 ELR 10561] the current Administration. But NEPPS also
may very well complicate EPA's efforts to have states meet its enforcement expectations, if it results in EPA granting
greater enforcement autonomy to the states before they have demonstrated bottomline success in achieving compliance
and improving the environment or, even, a commitment and the capacity to show how well they are doing. And it also
could undermine rather than enhance state accountability if it reduces EPA's ability to monitor state performance.
This Article discusses a number of options for EPA to strengthen state performance and bring it more in line with
EPA's expectations. First, EPA must play a stricter gate-keeping function in initially authorizing state programs, and
more regularly reassess and report the adequacy of state enforcement authorities and state capacity. Second, EPA must
stop delivering a mixed message to the states about the enforcement practices it expects the states to follow. Instead, it
must establish clear expectations for performance. Third, in terms of the substance of those expectations, EPA should
revise its criteria for evaluating whether state enforcement programs work. Because this question is central to EPA's
oversight practices, we discuss it at length in this Article. Among other things, we recommend that EPA place greater
emphasis on measures based on how well states are doing in actually achieving compliance by regulated entities, and,
to the extent feasible, improved environmental outcomes, although we also believe that continued reliance on
activity-based measures is appropriate. Fourth, EPA should explore different administrative approaches for conducting
program evaluations. Fifth, and related, EPA should improve its data management programs to enhance its ability to
evaluate state programs. Sixth, EPA should implement a "differential oversight" scheme that rewards in a meaningful
fashion better performing states. Seventh, EPA should publicly report its evaluation of state programs, and also
improve public accessibility to the underlying data about state performance, as a way of using the power of an external
spotlight to spur improved government performance. Eighth, EPA should make the prospect of program withdrawal a
more credible threat and should also develop more graduated sanctions short of outright program withdrawal. Finally,
EPA needs to continue to hone its capacity for strategic intervention—to help states to build capacity, and to take direct
action in selected cases when needed. These options are not mutually exclusive; instead, they can and must be
integrated in a variety of ways.
EPA Should Play a Stricter Gatekeeper Role in Authorizing State Programs
In enacting the federal environmental regulatory infrastructure, Congress reserved the role of primary program
implementers for the states, but only on the condition that the states demonstrate to EPA the capacity to fill this role. In
performing its authorization responsibilities, EPA has sought to strike a balance between national consistency and
deference to state autonomy interests by requiring states to show certain types of capacity but insisting on less than
functional equivalence with federal authority or capacity. In fact, EPA has authorized states to operate programs even
though the states' legal authorities created significant doubts about their ability to meet EPA expectations, such as their
ability to recover economic benefit realized by noncompliance.10 Critics have pointed out that as part of EPA's
authorization process, "staffing levels, the implications of weak administrative structures, the enforcement impacts of
review boards and other institutions, and the effects of state procedures are not always thoroughly understood."11
Compounding the present situation is that once authorization has been granted, EPA does not routinely reevaluate the
adequacy of state legal authorities or the level of state resources committed to implementing the state program.
In part, EPA's failure to take a harder look at state programs reflects political reality; as Professor Rodgers argues,
"there are psychological inhibitions among EPA staffers who have a limited number of 'no's' [sic] in their repertoires….
Refusals over time to give the reins to states willing to assume them also tend to become uncomfortable liabilities."12
While mindful of Professor Rodgers' assessment, we recommend that EPA pay greater attention to determining
enforcement capabilities in making initial decisions about whether to approve state program authorization. It is far
harder, politically and otherwise, to withdraw a program once authorization has been approved. Rather, EPA should
insist that its existing authorization requirements are honestly met by the states in the first instance.
Thus, in our view, at a minimum, states that lack the legal authority to recoup the economic benefit of significant
violations should not be authorized in the first place. Recovery of economic benefit has long been a cornerstone
element of EPA's enforcement policies,13 and indeed, is a central component of deterrence-based enforcement. If

regulated entities believe that because of limits in a state's enforcement authority they will realize savings, or
competitive advantages, from violating the law, they have little incentive to comply.
Likewise, EPA should not authorize states that lack administrative penalty authority. Such authority allows agencies to
impose penalties quickly and with a minimum of resources, and, as a result, Congress and many others have
recognized it is a key ingredient of an effective enforcement program. States which lack such authority are often
hindered in their ability to collect penalties from violators. Similarly, EPA should not—as it has done in the
past—approve state programs that have significant preconditions to the initiation of enforcement actions (such as
elaborate civil referral processes), or other cumbersome requirements that reduce the effectiveness of enforcement
activity.14 (It should [33 ELR 10562] be noted that under EPA's current authorization regulations, recovery of
economic benefit and administrative penalty authority are not expressly required as a condition of authorization.15 EPA,
however, has the authority to require that authorized state programs include these elements. The environmental statutes
speak in general terms about adequate enforcement authority being a condition of authorization,16 and, the courts have
accorded EPA substantial discretion in defining what this means.17 The Clean Air Act (CAA), moreover, specifically
requires that penalties assessed by state programs against stationary sources include the economic benefit of
noncompliance.)18
Moreover—especially since at this point over 75% of the major environmental programs that can be delegated are
administered by the states—frequent reassessment of the extent to which individual states meet the threshold
authorization criteria should be a priority. Thus, EPA annually should reassess the state legal authorities that it believes
are necessary to implement a federal program to determine if they have been eroded by judicial decisions, Attorney
General opinions, legislative changes, etc. EPA's Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) regulations require this type of
review, mandating an annual assessment of state compliance with "primacy standards,"19 but other statutes apparently
do not. EPA's review of state audit privilege/immunity legislation in the mid-1990s is an important example of the type
of ongoing review of state authorities that we have in mind, but by itself is too limited, focused just on this one aspect
of state laws. We recommend, moreover, that Congress require EPA to prepare an annual public report tracking state
environmental authorities in all states with authorized programs, including enforcement/compliance authorities.20
Similarly, EPA annually should satisfy itself that authorized states retain the other types of capacity needed to perform
their enforcement responsibilities adequately, such as financial support, personnel resources, and the like. EPA also
should publicly report its findings on these matters. While states generally have made significant strides in recent years
in upgrading their capacity, the inevitable ebbs and flows in economic conditions, legislative priorities, gubernatorial
politics, and other developments makes ongoing evaluation important. For example, during the 1990s a number of
states shifted personnel and resources from traditional enforcement activities to compliance assistance and other
programs. Does this leave them without adequate enforcement capacity to carry out the core functions deemed
important by EPA? Likewise, the downturn in the economy beginning in 2000 has left many states with significant
budgetary shortfalls. Has this resulted in programs operating with inadequate capacity? An official with ECOS
estimated in early 2002 that the nation's economic slowdown had forced states to cut environmental spending by $ 200
million nationwide.21 Indeed, in an extreme (and unusual) effort to draw attention to resource shortfalls within his state,
which had dropped it to last in the United States in both per capita and per industry spending on environmental issues,
in 1993 the governor of Indiana commenced the process of voluntarily returning to EPA its federally delegated
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Clean Water Act (CWA) permitting programs because of the
Indiana Legislature's failure to fund those programs adequately.22 Likewise, in 1993, Connecticut and Massachusetts
almost returned primacy for implementing the SDWA to EPA after their state budgets eliminated funding for the stateauthorized programs, and a recent report indicates that Missouri officials have asked EPA Region 7 to take back control
of the state's delegated CWA § 401 certification program because of a lack of resources.23
EPA Region 5's 2001 review of Ohio's environmental programs is instructive in this regard. The agency
found that
one of U.S. EPA's biggest concerns about Ohio's air enforcement program is the adequacy of the resources
provided to the agency. When OEPA [Ohio Environmental Protection Agency] first submitted its Title V

program for approval in 1992, it estimated that DAPC [Division of Air Pollution Control] would need 399
employees to run all of its air programs once the Title V program was in place. As of December 4, 2000,
DAPC only had 222 employees on staff…. In other words, OEPA may lack sufficient resources to perform
all of its permitting and enforcement duties.24
Notably, EPA's review of Ohio's program, discussed below, was undertaken in response to citizen withdrawal petitions
filed with EPA, not on EPA's own initiative. EPA might find similarly stark resource shortfalls if it periodically
reviewed agency capacity.
EPA, on occasion, has demonstrated the backbone to take a tougher approach to authorization. In recent years, for
instance, it has delayed authorization of new statutory programs, such as the CAA's Title V permitting program, to a
[33 ELR 10563] number of states because of unresolved concerns about state audit privilege and immunity laws or
other deficiencies in the state programs. Thus, for example, in 1996 EPA granted Maryland only interim, rather than
final, approval to implement the Title V program, because Maryland law did not give nonstate residents or businesses
the right to challenge agency permit decisions judicially, which contravenes the public participation requirements of the
Title V program.25 After several extensions, and after a lawsuit by environmental groups forced EPA's hand, in
December 2001, EPA withdrew its interim authorization and assumed control of the Title V program in Maryland.26
Even this action is less than it appears, because EPA contracted with Maryland's Department of the Environment to
continue to actually administer the program (on the assumption—which ultimately proved correct—that Maryland's
Legislature would act quickly to remedy the flaw in its standing law and resolve EPA's concerns). However, federal,
rather than state, permitting regulations provided the applicable law, and EPA, not Maryland, had authority over permit
decisions.27 In early 2003, after the Maryland Legislature had changed its standing law, EPA granted final full approval
of the state's Title V program, and returned control to the state.28
Unfortunately, this level of close EPA scrutiny of state programs' legal authority and capacity does not occur on a
systematic basis, but we recommend that it should.
EPA Needs to Deliver a Clearer Message About Its Expectations
EPA's oversight of the states from the mid-1990s to the present has been characterized by conflicting
themes. On the one hand, EPA has sought to give the states more leeway to pursue cooperation-based
enforcement strategies, and embarked on a new, more flexible oversight system, the NEPPS. On the other
hand, EPA has maintained that states should continue to follow all of its deterrence-based enforcement
policies, and that the Revised Policy Framework for State/EPA Enforcement Agreements (Policy
Framework), described below, still governs oversight of state programs.29 Moreover, parts of EPA have
appeared to encourage states to experiment with alternative compliance techniques, while other parts have
criticized the states for declining enforcement activities and other departures from EPA's enforcement
policies. In short, EPA has tried to have it both ways, and, unsurprisingly, states, as well as EPA regional
offices, report receiving a mixed message and confusing signals. The lack of central guidance from EPA in
1995 regarding implementation of the NEPPS has exacerbated the mixed message received by states and
regions. A recent evaluation notes that
no common understanding exists regarding the role of federal oversight—and there is consequently
uncertain scope for flexibility and the bounds of acceptable over-sight. This point is perhaps the most
serious. EPA intentionally implemented NEPPS without detailed, prescriptive program structure or
guidance. This decision on EPA's part was intended to allow states and regional offices the opportunity to
tailor their NEPPS efforts to their needs. There is a clear downside, however: we observed tremendous
uncertainty in EPA regional offices and in state agencies over the nature and degree of flexibility that EPA
can grant to states under NEPPS and over what level and type of accountability EPA must impose on states
and programs.30
EPA's ambivalent approach is driven by clear political imperatives. Many observers believe that permitting state

deviations from EPA's deterrence-based policies is the price it must pay for state cooperation. Prof. John Dwyer points
out, for example, that "the federal government cannot implement its air pollution program without the substantial
resources, expertise, information, and political support of state and local officials."31 Moreover, in the 1990s, EPA
granted states more flexibility (and indeed, embarked on a number of "reinvention" efforts) as a way to deflect political
pressure for more radical devolution or even deregulation of its authority. But it will be very difficult to secure
significant improvements in state performance until EPA adopts a less schizophrenic and more internally consistent
message, and delivers this message more clearly to the states and regional offices. Consistent with the analysis and
recommendations of the book from which this Article is excerpted,32 we argue that this message should be that the
states should follow an enforcement strategy firmly grounded in deterrence-based theory, but that also incorporates
cooperation-based elements such as compliance incentives and compliance assistance programs. In addition, as
discussed below, newer performance measures should be utilized as a basis for evaluating state enforcement programs,
so long as they provide for sufficient state accountability. In our view, this enforcement approach will best achieve
more widespread compliance with our environmental laws.
[33 ELR 10564]
EPA Should Revise Its Criteria for Evaluating the Efficacy of State Enforcement and Compliance Programs
As noted above, an issue at the heart of the federal/state environmental enforcement relationship is how to evaluate
whether enforcement programs work. Broadly speaking, there are three types of performance measures used to
evaluate environmental programs: environmental outcome indicators (sometimes called "terminal outcomes"33), such
as measures of air and water quality; behavioral outcomes (sometimes referred to as "intermediate outcomes," or
"program outcomes"), which reflect changes in the behavior of regulated entities in response to government actions,
such as compliance rates; and outputs, or measures of agency activity, such as the number of inspections carried out or
enforcement actions filed. Factors such as agency expenditures, staffing levels, and enforcement authorities, sometimes
referred to as "inputs," are also relevant. EPA's traditional approach for judging state performance, embodied in the
Agency's Policy Framework, focuses largely on the last broad category of performance measures, agency outputs.34
Critics argue that these evaluation measures result in a pre-occupation with numerical outputs rather than the
bottom-line success of enforcement efforts. State officials have contended that newer, more results-oriented
performance measures are necessary to fully capture the impacts of cooperative-based approaches, which do not rely
on the traditional tools measured by EPA. In recent years, EPA and the states have been trying to fashion new
evaluative criteria for judging enforcement programs. However, many of these measures have not yet been
implemented, and many states have not been willing to spend the resources required to do so, such as more extensively
monitoring ambient environmental conditions. Moreover, EPA and the states disagree about the extent to which these
newer measures should replace, or merely supplement, traditional measures.
This section discusses the evaluative criteria that EPA should use to evaluate the efficacy of state enforcement efforts.
While environmental indicators most closely reflect the bottomline issue of the condition of the ambient environment
and thus in theory are the most desirable measures, they generally are expensive to implement. Moreover, by and large
it is very difficult to link ambient environmental conditions to enforcement activity or compliance assistance programs
(although there are some recent pilot projects in which this has been done successfully, as we discuss below). Thus, we
do not think it is currently realistic to shift primarily toward an indicator-based system, although efforts should
certainly be made to increase the capacity to do so. We think that greater reliance should be placed on behavioral
outcome measures, particularly various indices of compliance by regulated entities, although calculating compliance
rates also can be quite expensive and raise challenging methodological issues. Finally, even with a shift to outcomefocused performance measures, we believe that the more traditional activity-based indices remain a useful and
necessary tool, especially if enhanced to provide additional information about enforcement and compliance assistance
activities.
Environmental Indicators
There has been widespread discussion in recent years about the desirability of using environmental indicators to

evaluate the effectiveness of agency programs, including enforcement programs, and NEPPS envisions that EPA and
the states will shift toward such measures. Environmental indicators are measures of environmental and public health
conditions and how they change over time. These include ambient air concentrations, water quality conditions,
drinking water quality, acres of damaged wildlife habitat, and so forth. Some environmental statutes have long required
agencies to monitor certain environmental conditions. For example, under the CAA, states must regularly monitor
ambient concentrations of criteria air pollutants. Under the CWA, at least in theory, states must regularly assess the
condition of water bodies within their jurisdiction (we say "in theory" because in practice most states have fallen well
short of this requirement, as noted below). Other indicators might be geared to gauging the human health consequences
of noncompliance, such as the number of reported illnesses from water systems out of compliance with drinking water
standards, reported illnesses from consuming fish caught in waters that do not meet water quality standards, or the
population affected by noncompliance with air quality standards.
Although environmental indicators represent the most desirable performance metric, they should not be the principal
means for evaluating the effectiveness of enforcement programs in the immediate future, for several reasons.
First, it generally is very hard to link enforcement or compliance activities to improvements in the environment.
Although some water quality and air quality changes can happen quickly, other changes in environmental conditions,
particularly those impacting entire ecosystems or more distant locales, may take years to manifest themselves. The
focus of enforcement activity, by contrast, is short term. Moreover, a range of external variables other than how well an
enforcement program is operating—factors such as weather, the condition of the economy, demographic trends,
etc.—may influence ambient conditions. The environmental indicators used may not capture the full range of changes
triggered by enforcement actions.35
To date, few studies have sought to isolate the impacts of individual enforcement activities on
environmental conditions. For example, in its survey of state environmental [33 ELR 10565] agencies,
ECOS found that none were able to provide measures of the effectiveness of compliance assistance
programs.36 Scholars such as Prof. William Gormley argue that the impacts of agency enforcement
activities have been successfully measured in other fields, such as education and health care. He notes,
however, that "genuine measures of environmental impact [from agency activities] are practically
nonexistent," and that it is particularly difficult to measure the impacts of decisions made by
environmental agencies.37 Even states that have been leaders in seeking to develop performance measures,
such as Florida and Oregon, he points out, still rely very heavily on traditional output measures, and, to a
lesser extent, outcome measures. Gormley elaborates:
The production of authentic impact measures would be both complex and expensive. The failure of the
four state agencies [studied by Gormley—Florida, Oregon, New Hampshire, and Virginia] to produce such
measures reflects resource constraints, as well as the state of the art. Even the U.S. EPA, with much larger
research and planning staffs, has not developed a battery of good, reliable impact measures. We have much
better statistical models for isolating the effects of government interventions in education and health care
on desired outcomes in those areas.38
One notable exception is EPA's Clean Charles 2005 initiative, a multi-pronged effort launched in 1995 by EPA's
Region 1 to make the Charles River swimmable in 10 years. In that instance EPA was able, to a considerable extent, to
gauge the effectiveness of various enforcement and compliance assistance actions it undertook, and to isolate these
effects from other background variables. EPA accomplished this by monitoring water quality in the river very
frequently (monthly), using geographically close measuring stations, focusing on a limited water body (the Charles
River is only 80 miles long), and separately monitoring water quality during wet weather and dry weather conditions,
in an attempt to isolate the impacts of wet weather on pollution levels (since stormwater runoff during heavy rains
tends to significantly affect water quality).39 Researchers Shelley Metzenbaum and Tiffin Shewmake argue that other
"place-linked" efforts such as this can help overcome some of the difficulties in linking ambient conditions to
enforcement activity.40

Second, the data necessary to meaningfully implement such performance measures is woefully lacking. The state of
data about water quality in the United States is an oft-cited example, and it is telling. For instance, according to EPA,
as of 1998 states had assessed water quality for only 23% of the nation's rivers and streams, 42% of its lakes, ponds,
and reservoirs, and 32% of its estuaries.41 Even for those water bodies that have been assessed, the data is often
unreliable and inconsistent across states (or even over time within the same state). Many states report attaining water
quality standards based on measurements of dissolved oxygen or suspended solids, not using other biological, physical,
or chemical parameters deemed important by EPA.42 Some states report that water bodies are "assessed" based on a
single sample anywhere on the body, no matter how large it is; others assume that rivers for which no information
exists are supporting their uses; and many water bodies are "evaluated" rather than "assessed," meaning there is no
current site-specific data available for them.43 The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) found in 2000 that only six
states reported that they had a majority of the data needed to assess whether their waters meet water quality standards.
Another recent report on environmental conditions in eight Great Lake states concluded that "the quality and
consistency of state environmental data needs dramatic improvement. States collect and report even the most basic air
and water quality data in ways that make comparisons difficult and frustrate the public's ability to understand their own
state's problems and progress."44
It will take tens of millions of dollars, if not more—and years—to remedy this informational shortfall. Critics have
called for the establishment of a bureau of environmental statistics, led by a professional appointed by the president
and confirmed by the U.S. Senate for a fixed term, and with sufficient budget and independence to be insulated from
the political process, and for strengthening EPA's Office of Environmental Information, giving it authority to build far
better information about environmental conditions and results.45 We agree with these recommendations, but we are a
long way from having these federal resources in place. [33 ELR 10566] Moreover, it is hard to imagine that states will
have the political will to develop such measures.46 Nor does effective pressure from EPA to force the states' hand seem
likely. As the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) recently concluded, EPA approved, indeed invited,
the participation in NEPPS of some states that had poor track records of performance and little or no history of
developing performance measures.47 Likewise, while some states have included performance measures in their
Performance Partnership Agreements (PPAs) with EPA,48 many have failed to implement these measures, with no
apparent consequences from EPA.49 Even during the economic prosperity of the late 1990s, states apparently did not
increase their spending on environmental protection; in fact, according to ECOS, overall state environmental spending
declined slightly from 1996 to 2000.50
An alternative indicator measure is trends in statewide or regional emission or discharge levels from regulated
facilities, particularly trends in such levels in excess of permit limits. For example, a state agency could examine the
collective level of discharges of a set of pollutants from regulated entities over a period of time, compare it to the level
of legally permitted discharges, and see whether the trend is toward compliance or away from compliance with
discharge limits. Calculating this type of measure is more feasible than obtaining comprehensive ambient data, since
many facilities are required to monitor their routine air and water discharges, although this measure is less reflective of
"bottom-line" environmental health.51 It should be noted, however, that such measures, even when feasible, have their
limits as well. For example, an enforcement program may be successful in prompting compliance with important
regulatory requirements (training, spill prevention, emergency planning, etc.) that do not translate into demonstrable
emission reductions (a point we also discuss below).
Thus, we recommend that at present, EPA not place principal emphasis on environmental indicators measures in its
evaluative criteria, although it should make a concerted effort to develop the capacity to use such measures in the
future.
Rates of Compliance and Other Outcome Data
The second type of performance measure is behavioral outcomes measures, which reflect the actions taken by
regulated entities or the public in response to enforcement actions. In our view, one outcome measure, levels of
compliance, should be very significant in judging the efficacy of enforcement programs. After all, the underlying goal
of enforcement efforts is to ensure that regulated entities comply with the law. If a state can show that high percentages

of its regulated facilities, especially major facilities whose non-compliance can pose significant adverse impacts,
consistently comply with environmental requirements, there generally is little basis for EPA to question the mix of its
enforcement and compliance assistance strategies. Indeed, the states have identified compliance rates as the
performance measure they would most prefer to use to evaluate their enforcement programs (although relatively few
do so).52 At the same time, it is important to recognize that compliance rates do not tell the full story about the efficacy
of a state's environmental program. If a state's underlying permit requirements are weak, or outdated, for instance (and
recent studies indicate that a distressingly high number of CWA permits are outdated),53 a high rate of compliance may
not be particularly meaningful or informative about the condition of the state's environment. This is obviously an issue
that extends well beyond the efficacy of an enforcement program.
The Policy Framework identifies rates of compliance as one criterion for evaluating state program performance, and
compliance measures are now included in the core accountability measures identified by the Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance (OECA) for evaluating state enforcement and compliance activities.54 But historically,
compliance measures have not played a central role in EPA's evaluation of state programs. A major reason for this is
that there are significant difficulties in trying to calculate compliance rates (only a few of which are highlighted here).
For example, to obtain a valid measure of compliance rates by a particular industry, agencies need to survey all
regulated facilities, or chose a statistically reliable subgroup at random. But in many cases agencies have traditionally
targeted facilities to inspect based on factors such as which facilities pose known or suspected risks, a facility's volume
of emissions, past compliance history, etc. Likewise, in attempting to measure progress in rates of compliance, an
important pre-requisite is baseline data with which to compare current conditions. But both EPA and state agencies
have limited baseline information. For instance, the agencies have background compliance information typically only
for larger, more significant facilities; data are especially scarce for small businesses that historically received few
inspections.
Another thorny set of issues concerns how to measure what compliance is, including the appropriate time period in
which to judge compliance. Does compliance mean total continuous compliance, or compliance in excess of a certain
[33 ELR 10567] percentage of the time? EPA assesses compliance quarterly; if a firm is out of compliance once each
quarter, it may be considered out of compliance for an entire year. Looked at differently, the same data would show a
facility in compliance most of the time.55
A related issue pertains to the time it takes a firm to return to compliance, after noncompliance is discovered. After a
violation is uncovered, how quickly must a firm act in order to be considered in compliance?56 Moreover, how does the
government verify compliance? Is it based on an on-site inspection and sampling? A physical inspection without
sampling? A phone call? A facility's self-monitoring records?
And related, but separate, and of central importance, what is the definition of significant noncompliance? EPA and the
states have often disagreed in recent years over what the definition of this term is, leading to considerable acrimony.
NAPA recently concluded that no standard methodology exists for calculating reliable compliance rates.57
To facilitate use of compliance data as a central measuring tool, EPA should work with the states to develop standard
methodologies for calculating compliance rates. This should include an agreed-upon (and consistently interpreted)
definition of significant noncompliance for purposes of federally authorized programs. There are no easy answers to
some of the questions posed above, but using a standard methodology will greatly enhance EPA's ability to evaluate the
progress of state programs and compare them to each other, and also allow states to learn from one another. (The
Environmental Compliance Consortium—a project of approximately 15 states and academics working to develop
better ways to measure enforcement and compliance programs—also has suggested that compliance rate information
can be very useful even if compliance rate methodologies are not fully standardized, provided that state agencies
clearly report all of the variables that affect the determination of the compliance rates.58 That project is seeking to
develop ways for states to report compliance rates in a way that makes the underlying assumptions more transparent.)
Once standard compliance rate methodologies are adopted, we recommend that several types of compliance data,
among others, be used to judge state performance:

1. Obviously, of central importance is the overall rate of compliance: What percentage of regulated facilities are found
in noncompliance, and what percentage in significant noncompliance? Secondarily, what is the rate of compliance and
significant noncompliance in sectors identified by EPA or the states as high priority, because of the high volume or
high toxicity of facility emissions, significant potential for harm from activities, proximity to population, contribution
to air or water quality violations, or other factors?
2. Of facilities found in significant noncompliance, how many are repeat violators from the prior five years? How
quickly are the facilities found in violation returned to compliance? These questions illuminate how well an
enforcement program is working to deal with problematic facilities.
3. What is the percentage of facilities found in compliance during unannounced inspections? (Compliance rates based
on pre-announced inspections may not be as illuminating as those found based on surprise visits. While it may not be
practicable to make all or even most visits unannounced, it would be helpful to obtain data from at least some subset of
regulated facilities based on surprise visits.)
4. What is the severity of noncompliance that occurs, and its potential environmental and health impacts? For example,
how much additional pollutant loadings or emissions have resulted from facility noncompliance? How far in excess of
permitted levels are noncompliant facilities' releases? How many unregulated waste streams, newly created waste sites,
or environmental threats are found at facilities where noncompliance occurred?
5. What is the rate of noncompliance among facilities that received compliance assistance, voluntarily disclosed
violations under state audit laws or policies, or participated in other cooperative enforcement programs, as compared to
historic rates of noncompliance, or rates of compliance by the entire universe of regulated facilities? This can help
states (and EPA) assess the efficacy of these alternative enforcement approaches.
Finally, another useful behavioral outcome measure (although not strictly a compliance index) is environmental and
health improvements resulting from enforcement actions, compliance incentive programs, or compliance assistance
programs. This can include reductions in pollutants discharged; institution of new compliance management procedures;
or other behavioral changes by regulated entities. These measures can help provide a fuller picture of the efficacy and
impacts of agency enforcement activities.
Many states do not currently report the measures outlined above, including rates of compliance, the performance
metric the states indicate that they prefer to be judged by. For its part, EPA in its own enforcement program, now
reports many of these measures, including the percentage of recurrent significant nonviolators, the duration of
significant noncompliance, and the environmental and health improvements [33 ELR 10568] resulting from
enforcement actions.59 EPA also has started determining compliance rates for selected regulated sectors.60
Agency Enforcement Activities
Outputs are measures of program activity, the traditional "beans" used by EPA to evaluate state enforcement programs.
These include the number of inspections, number of notices issued, civil and criminal actions filed, and, more recently,
the number of facilities that are reached through various compliance assistance efforts and that voluntarily disclose
violations under audit policies or laws.
Critics charge that EPA should pay relatively little attention to these enforcement indices as metrics of performance and
instead focus on results-based measures. (Some commentators, such as NAPA, also suggest that activities-based data
should not be used to evaluate state performance because of inadequacies in the data and disputes between the states
and EPA over its accuracy.)61 We conclude, however, that it would be inappropriate—indeed irresponsible—for EPA to
discount traditional measures of performance, especially until better performance measures are developed and
implemented, and data improve. Despite the advent of NEPPS and its promise of performance-based management,
many states have not developed new performance measures, or even gathered the data required by their PPAs (although
to be fair, some have made some significant breakthroughs). As noted above, moreover, huge gaps remain in our data
about ambient environmental conditions, and about compliance rates.62

Interestingly, moreover, despite the chorus of public calls by states and other critics for newer, results-oriented
performance measures, many states still appear to be comfortable with the traditional evaluative criteria. For example,
in Region 8, which has recently implemented a new uniform oversight system that we profile below, the oversight
criteria, all agreed to by the states in the region, focus very heavily on traditional measures of performance, including
compliance/monitoring strategies, timely and appropriate enforcement action, and accurate and complete data
management. These are, according to Region 8 officials, the evaluation criteria the states were interested in using. The
Region broached the idea of using more outcome-based measures. Several states declined. Other states expressed
interest in using such measures in addition to tracking the base program performance, and the Region added an
additional criterion, entitled "Alternative Projects Evaluation," that is intended to encompass alternative approaches to
promoting compliance. The Region also indicated that several states expressed little interest in this criterion. Their
primary interest lay in obtaining feedback on performance of the core enforcement functions. (With respect to NEPPS,
Region 8 advised that all of the NEPPS accountability measures that are "outcome" measures are only "pilot"
measures; states only have been asked to report regarding these measures, they are not obligated to do so. At least in
Region 8's experience, none of the states has done so.)63 Likewise, in Region 1, the Region and states have agreed to a
system of comprehensive, multimedia reviews of state environmental and compliance assistance programs that do not
contain information on outcomes or environmental results.64
Other arguments support continued reliance on activitybased measures. One of the central findings of the empirical
research about enforcement is that enforcement presence matters. Repeated studies show, among other things, that
more frequent inspections promote compliance (as well as reduced emissions).65 (We know less about the impacts of
compliance assistance visits or other monitoring efforts.)66 Thus, EPA should continue to require states to report data
about the number of inspections and other compliance monitoring efforts carried out by their enforcement programs,
since this is one strategy that the empirical literature indicates works. Ideally, states should report the coverage
achieved by their programs, i.e., the percentage of regulated facilities reached by inspections and other activities.67
Similar reasons counsel retaining other deterrencebased indices, such as the degree to which states take timely [33
ELR 10569] and appropriate enforcement action in response to noncompliance, and impose escalating and meaningful
penalties in response to repeated violations, since enforcement research and experience suggests that these actions also
promote compliance, although the evidence about this is less well-developed.
Moreover, as Professor Gormley explains, states need to continue to collect data on the level of program
activity in order to accurately compare the relative efficacy of various enforcement and compliance tools.
Despite recent research in this area, there still is relatively very little empirical data examining which
enforcement and compliance tools work best.68 Gormley points out:
If states that opt for more technical assistance and fewer civil penalties against polluters experience greater
environmental improvements than other states, that would be an extremely important finding. But we will
never know that—or the reverse—unless states continue to collect output data on a regular basis. The ideal
set of performance measures is a mix of outputs and outcomes, not outcomes alone.69
Likewise, even once systematic data are in place for performance measures, it is important to continue to measure
output measures, because outcomes are so significantly influenced by factors beyond the control of agencies.70 For the
reasons detailed above, ambient environmental conditions are affected by a range of considerations apart from the
efficacy of enforcement efforts. Compliance rates as well may be influenced by economic and industry trends,
prevailing industry beliefs about the reasonableness of environmental regulation, and other factors. Likewise, a
facility's compliance with certain regulatory requirements, such as the many standards that are preventative, may not
translate into quantifiable emissions reductions or environmental benefits. As EPA has correctly noted, "causality
between program activities and outcomes is usually impossible to prove. Outcomes generally cannot be attributed to
individual functions of an agency or program. 'Prevention' or deterrence of undesired outcomes is difficult to
measure."71
Accordingly, we believe that EPA should continue to require states to report many of the traditional activitybased
measures currently required by the agency. (As explained below, we advocate a system of differential oversight in

which better performing states will be relieved from various reporting requirements.) Thus, states should report the
percentage of the regulated community that is reached by enforcement activities, including traditional inspections, as
well as, to the extent feasible, compliance assistance visits or other regulatory interactions. (We recognize that
accurately tracking the coverage of compliance assistance programs can be problematic, since some companies prefer
to participate in such programs anonymously.)72 Likewise, states should report on their responses to instances of
significant noncompliance. In counting enforcement responses, EPA should consider informal enforcement actions,
which the states argue can effectively return facilities to compliance, such as oral warnings, warning letters, and notices
of violations that require facilities to correct violations without assessing penalties.
We discuss below two suggestions for supplementing the traditional measures used by EPA.
Response to Citizen Complaints
ECOS reports that in 1999, states received 88,000 complaints from citizens.73 While it is uncertain how many of those
involved compliance- and enforcement-related issues, it is fair to presume that a substantial portion did. States vary in
their procedures for receiving and handling such complaints. In its recent audit of Ohio's environmental programs, for
example, EPA expressed concern that the rigors of the state's complaint process may dissuade citizens from sending in
complaints.74 Likewise, in a 2001 audit, EPA's Inspector General concluded that the states examined did not maintain
adequate or consistent tracking systems for citizen complaints, even though such complaints are an important source of
violation information.75
We think that EPA should consider, as a component of state performance, how well a state facilitates and responds to
citizen complaints. Admittedly, this may be difficult to measure in any type of meaningful qualitative way, other than
perhaps to survey representative samples of citizens. One useful index might be how quickly complaints are responded
to and resolved. Another is whether and how well the agency has publicized its complaint process. Another is how
many complaints led to some type of contact with a regulated entity, whether the provision of technical advice, an
informal visit, or enforcement activity. Our suggestion, in short, is that a state should be judged in part on how well it
serves the public, and measures should be developed and implemented to facilitate evaluations on this basis.
Reporting Information to the Public
As we argue later in this Article, EPA has limited leverage in influencing state enforcement practices, and,
as a result, public disclosure of agency performance is likely to generate some of the most effective
pressure for improvement. In order to generate such pressure, agency performance data must be disclosed
to the public in clear, meaningful, easily accessible, i.e., on-line searchable, and standard, i.e., consistent
from year to year, formats. States should be evaluated on how well they discharge their obligation to report
performance data to the public in this fashion. Environmental groups can use this data to compile
organizational report cards on the efficacy of state enforcement efforts. At least 24 [33 ELR 10570] states
have published "state of the environment" reports or analogous environmental indicator reports, with the
number having increased significantly in recent years.76 We agree with the recommendations of a recent
NAPA report that
each state should publicly report its progress in achieving environmental results as part of an annual stateof-the-environment report. These reports can strengthen the accountability of government agencies to each
other and to the public. They also can facilitate learning across agencies.77
In a similar vein, the Michigan Environmental Council, in its recent review of the environmental performance of eight
Great Lake states, included as an evaluative criterion the quality of "state of the environment reports." The council
explained that the most important factor in reviewing the reports "is whether they serve as a useful 'one-stop' digest for
the information citizens are entitled to have on the full gamut of a state's environmental programs."78
In recommending that reporting information to the public be a basis for judging state performance, we believe that the
recent failure of most states to encourage public involvement under NEPPS is instructive. Although one of the basic

tenets of NEPPS is to "facilitate and encourage public understanding of environmental conditions and government
activities,"79 an outside review in 2000 found that most states had made little progress in involving the public in the
NEPPS process. The review also concluded that the states' poor performance was attributable in part to EPA's failure to
insist upon such efforts as a condition for approving PPAs.80 If, in contrast to this early experience under NEPPS, states
know they will be judged by how well they provide enforcement data to the public, they are likely to respond with
better information.
Agency "Inputs"—Spending and Staffing
For a state to receive authorization from EPA, it must demonstrate adequate resources to implement the federal
programs. We believe that an ongoing measure of state performance should be the state's level of environmental
spending and staffing, measured against the level of commitments promised to EPA as part of receiving authorization
to administer a program. Money is certainly not a panacea to achieving compliance, but it does matter. Studies by Prof.
Eric Helland report the intuitive conclusion that states with less resources focus their efforts on more routine
inspections rather than comprehensive sampling inspections, which may be up to 10 times more likely to detect a major
violation.81 Likewise, in its 2001 audit of Ohio's air enforcement program, EPA found serious resource gaps, noting
that the state appeared to lack sufficient resources to perform all of its permitting and enforcement duties.82 Another
recent EPA audit found that the Los Angeles water quality control board had only 2.5 staff years to monitor more than
3,300 stormwater permit holders and conduct searches for as many as 10,000 unpermitted facilities that were subject to
regulation.83 On its face, a program like this is grossly underfunded and cannot hope to achieve meaningful
enforcement coverage.
Better Methods of Program Evaluation
What is the best administrative approach for EPA regional offices to use in conducting oversight of state
enforcement and compliance efforts? EPA affords regional offices considerable latitude, and in practice,
they use different approaches.84 For example, in the early 1990s Region 1 adopted an unusually
comprehensive approach to oversight in which it conducts one review at a time; as of late 2001, it had
completed reviews of four of the six states, with a fifth virtually done and the sixth to be completed within
the year.85 EPA's Inspector General found in 2001 that other regional offices were also performing in-depth
evaluations of state programs, although the scope and frequency of these evaluations varied. For example,
Region 4 performed indepth evaluations every eight years or so, while Region 6 did so on a semiannual
basis.86 In short, regional oversight has been inconsistent and not always very effective. EPA's Inspector
General, writing about the CWA, concluded in 2001 that
to ensure fair and effective enforcement … EPA regions need to improve their in-depth program
evaluations and annual performance evaluations of state performance. These evaluations need to be
consistent, continue toward a goal of measuring the effectiveness of performance, and be made easily
accessible to the public.87
We recommend that EPA systematically review the oversight methods of the regional offices, pick out some of the best
features of the various approaches, and make a concerted effort to improve the quality and consistency of oversight
evaluations nationwide. In particular, EPA should recommend approaches that allow for consistent comparisons among
states and programs, and that are transparent to the public. There are a number of examples that EPA can look to. One
is the Region 1 strategy, mentioned above. Another example comes from Region 4, which developed a series of charts
showing how each of the states in its area is meeting the core performance measures identified by NEPPS as the basis
for judging state performance (including measures showing the performance of state waste, water, air, as well [33 ELR
10571] as enforcement and compliance assurance programs).88 The charts also indicate performance measures for
which the states do not have any data. Another related example (outside of EPA) is the evaluation of the environmental
performance of eight Great Lake states that was recently completed by the Michigan Environmental Council. The
council evaluated the states on a set of consistent criteria, including the strength of their statutory authorities, and
implementation of policies, for addressing certain key environmental problems; the rights they afforded citizens to

participate in agency decisions; and how well they reported information to the public in "state of the environment"
reports.89
We describe two additional possibilities below. One is a "unified" approach recently initiated by Region 8, which has
been identified by some observers as a leader in innovative oversight practices. This approach is simple and
understandable, and because of its common format across program areas and across states, allows for easy comparisons
of performance and prioritization of resources. An alternative method is to have regular external evaluations of state
performance, to ensure the type of hard look review that has been lacking from some regional evaluations.
A Unified Enforcement Oversight Approach
Region 8 efforts to revamp its oversight efforts were precipitated in part by a critical EPA Inspector General audit of
the Pennsylvania enforcement program in 1997, and in part by the request of state environmental directors to have
Region 8 move away from case-by-case reviews of enforcement activities and instead provide after-the-fact reviews of
the overall performance of their enforcement program and activities.90
Region 8 brought its programs together and, working with state counterparts, developed a uniform enforcement
oversight system (UEOS) intended to bring a greater level of consistency to EPA oversight (across programs) and also
to establish in a straightforward way what the expectations should be.91 Region 8 first used the UEOS in 1998, refined
the version for fiscal year (FY) 1999, and has refined it still further for FY 2002, based on "consensus
recommendations" from regional office personnel and personnel from the six Region 8 states (Colorado, Montana,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming). The UEOS covers enforcement programs in the air, hazardous
waste, drinking water, and water pollution control programs.92 It focuses on "core" program activities, divided into four
categories: compliance monitoring, i.e., inspections-related performance, enforcement activities, e.g., pursuit of timely
and appropriate enforcement, database management, e.g., timely submission of accurate and complete data, and
performance under annual agreements, i.e., the PPA or state/EPA agreement. There are 14 criteria listed for UEOS
2002.
There are several notable features of this approach. First, it is manageable for Region 8 and states alike. The 14 criteria
take up all of one page. (The program-specific "legends" that provide background on what each program is interested
in learning for each criterion are set up so that each is quite accessible, and is only eight pages long. For each criterion,
the review provides for three types of information: (1) findings; (2) the information reviewed; and (3)
recommendations if corrective action is needed.) Thus, the basic expectations are laid out clearly and succinctly,
eliminating the need to search through reams of guidance, policies, directives, agreements, and the like to try to
determine the precise measures or expectations against which performance will be evaluated.93 Further, from its
structure and content, the UEOS' purpose—problem diagnosis and problem solving, rather than finger pointing
—comes through clearly. Region 8 first lays out its findings about a state's performance. It then spells out the sources
of information that it reviewed in reaching those findings. Finally, it concludes with recommendations for fixing any
deficiencies.
The UEOS makes it much easier for EPA managers to identify patterns in performance within and across states. The 14
performance criteria are identical for all programs94; program-specific legends are based on a generic legend Region 8
prepared, ensuring additional consistency in the format and content of the evaluations. Previously, Region 8 did not use
consistent criteria across programs or use a common format for evaluation, so it was much more difficult to spot
patterns or to get an overview of program strengths and weaknesses.95 Indeed, commentators more generally have
argued that the varying criteria traditionally used to evaluate state programs "virtually precludes comparison either
between states or between programs," and that the information is "not presented in a way which encourages [its] use by
the public and legislators."96
Regional staff believe that the new oversight system has led to improvements in state performance, by facilitating
better communication and joint problem solving.97 Specifically, they report: (1) one state's hazardous waste program
went from having 50% of penalty orders include both gravity and economic benefit calculations, to 100%; (2) a [33

ELR 10572] state CWA permit program is finally drafting an Enforcement Management Strategy after discussions and
a clear understanding that it was not collecting the correct economic benefit and gravity portions of its enforcement
penalties; (3) a state air program made great improvements in its inspection reports; and (4) one state's drinking water
program has reduced the number of lead and copper significant noncomplying facilities by 83%. The new oversight
system also has facilitated EPA's implementation of an (informal) differential oversight scheme for the states. Region 8
has the program directors review the evaluations for all six states together. Using the same forms, applying the same
criteria, and reviewing the evaluations at the same time has enabled Region 8 to systematically identify gaps in state
performance and allocate its resources accordingly. (This informal differential oversight typically takes one of two
forms—the provision of additional technical assistance or a decision to conduct additional oversight, such as reviewing
more inspection reports, or conducting more oversight inspections.)98
Region 8's approach also can easily be used to facilitate public comparisons of relative state performance—an idea we
endorse in more detail below—though one which Region 8 has not pursued. Indeed, initially, Region 8 calculated
numerical scores for the states so that it would be possible to compare state scores and rank them. It subsequently
eliminated the scores because of its sense that they were distracting and that too much time was spent debating the
details that affected the score.99 Probably Region 8's concern about impairing its working relationship with the states
was also a factor. The trade off, however, is a loss of easily comparable evaluations. Moreover, the regional evaluations
of state performance are not public; again, as we argue below, these types of evaluations should be disclosed to
enhance public accountability of state agencies.
"External" Evaluations of State Performance
One reason that EPA oversight of state programs has not been more effective is the tight link between EPA regional
offices and the states they supervise. Many regional administrators have close political ties with state officials and may
be more responsive to pressures from state officials than to EPA headquarters. Indeed, a great deal of the publicly
available evidence about the quality of state performance has come not from EPA's regional offices but from "outside"
auditors, particularly EPA's Inspector General and the GAO. In a series of audits and reviews in the mid- and late
1990s, these offices documented widespread inadequacies in state enforcement efforts.100
To ensure a "harder look" at state performance practices, we believe that EPA should institute a system of regular,
"external" (that is, outside of the regional offices) review of state performance. This could come in a number of forms.
For example, EPA could ask the Inspector General's office to regularly audit state enforcement programs. NAPA
opined in its 2000 report that the Inspector General has the resources and potential to perform effective program
evaluation of EPA programs, but that it would have to transform its staff expertise to do so.101 Another worthwhile idea
is offered by Lee Paddock and Suellen Keiner. They suggest that specially trained, experienced EPA staff, or perhaps
senior staff from other states, be used to evaluate state performance. They note that this is similar to what the Dutch
government does to evaluate provincial and municipal environmental programs.102 It also is comparable to how the
U.S. Department of Justice evaluates the performance of its 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices; evaluations of U.S. Attorneys'
Offices are conducted by teams of experienced prosecutors and administrative personnel from other U.S. Attorneys'
Offices.103 Such an approach can have multiple benefits: those being evaluated are likely to take the findings of the
evaluators seriously because of the evaluators' closely related backgrounds; at the same time, evaluators are likely to be
exposed to different approaches through the evaluation process that will help to inform their own performance in their
"home offices."
EPA and the States Should Improve Their Data Management Systems
An issue closely related to that of developing new evaluative criteria for state enforcement programs is the need for
EPA and the states to improve the quality of their data management systems, and in particular to improve their
coordination in managing such information. Numerous observers have pointed out that existing enforcement and
compliance data is of relatively poor quality. The lack of better quality data considerably complicates efforts to
evaluate state performance. It has also led to contentious disputes between EPA and the states over the reliability of
enforcement data and what conclusions can be drawn from it, and makes it hard for the public to access enforcement

and compliance information.
Thus, for example, NAPA found that "EPA's current data systems are seriously limited by data inaccuracies, [the]
failure of some states to submit complete data, separate single-medium systems, and data inaccessibility because
information resides on antiquated main-frame machines."104 There are also significant discrepancies between data
maintained by the states and EPA, and EPA and the states' databases are generally not technically compatible.105 ECOS,
for instance, found that about 80% of states had experienced significant data discrepancies between their state data and
the data as it appears in EPA's databases.106 Likewise, a 2002 report by EPA's Inspector General found that the National
Enforcement Docket System (DOCKET), the official EPA [33 ELR 10573] database for tracking and reporting on civil
judicial and administrative enforcement actions, "contained significant instances of inaccurate and incomplete data."107
An audit of CWA enforcement by the Inspector General similarly found that "EPA's Permit Compliance System—its
national permitting and enforcement system—was incomplete, inaccurate and obsolete…. Hundreds of thousands of
dischargers were not monitored by the system."108 And, tellingly, when ECOS attempted to prepare its comprehensive
report of state enforcement activity to Congress in 2001, only 38 states were able to provide data about enforcement
and compliance assistance activities. ECOS had to resort to EPA's databases for data on the state's own enforcement
activities (even though states have been required to keep such data under an EPA-ECOS agreement at least since
1995).109
Clearly it is desirable to fix these shortcomings and coordination problems, and EPA has undertaken a number of
efforts in recent years to do so. The GAO reported, for example, that the OECA has organized a series of workgroups
to address data quality issues.110 EPA is in the process of implementing a system to modernize its enforcement and
compliance systems, called the Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS). EPA's creation of an Office of
Environmental Information in 1999 is likely to lead to easier access to information in EPA's database.111 Another effort
under way to improve the accuracy and flow of enforcement data is the National Environmental Information Exchange
Network, an information network that is creating common data standards and standardized methods of data exchange
between EPA and the states.112 In 2001, Congress authorized $ 25 million to implement the Exchange Network, and it
approved nearly $ 20 million a year later.113 As NAPA correctly has concluded, moreover, "it is not sufficient merely to
fix the data systems and improve the flow and accuracy of existing data activities. The systems must also be
modernized, integrated, and expanded to include more environmental data, greater ability to analyze them, and
increased utility for setting priorities, targeting resources, and providing better information to the public."114 We
recommend that EPA and the states vigorously pursue these efforts, and, in particular, that they devote sufficient
resources to ensure that these data quality problems are remedied.
EPA Should Implement a Formal System of Differential Oversight Based on State Performance
We believe that a key to improving state performance is making states more accountable by establishing a clear
"differential oversight" approach that encourages good performance and discourages undesirable behavior. EPA should
provide relatively substantial oversight and less flexible funding for states with poor performance, including increased
EPA review of state permits and inspections, and reduced oversight and increased flexibility in terms of use of federal
funds for better performing states.
The idea of differential oversight is quite straightforward: EPA should have a strategy for overseeing states that
provides maximum encouragement and incentives for desired behavior. Since states strongly prefer less oversight, a
differential oversight scheme should be a strong incentive to encourage desired state behavior. Moreover, such an
approach would allow for the most efficient deployment of limited federal enforcement resources.
There has long been widespread agreement that EPA has the flexibility to tailor the exercise of its
oversight responsibilities based on the performance and capabilities of particular states and that,
conceptually, differential oversight is a good idea. NAPA, one of the strongest proponents of devolving
authority to the states, argued in 1995 that
the paired ideas of "differential oversight" and "accountable devolution" that are beginning to percolate

within the agency hold particular promise as a model for encouraging less prescriptive environmental
management approaches without compromising environmental quality…. Differential oversight would
match EPA's intervention in the state to the state's success in achieving desired results. In some states,
EPA's involvement would be limited to constructive program review and public praise; in others, EPA
would have to work more aggressively to ensure a basic level of environmental protection.115
Moreover, NEPPS reinforces, and indeed embraces, the notion of differential oversight as one of its key principles.
Unfortunately, EPA and the states have retreated from the differential oversight system envisioned in
NEPPS—both the concept of "leadership" status for the absolutely best performing states, as well as the
idea of a formal differential system that distinguishes, and rewards, better performing states. The major
reason appears to be state resistance to such a scheme and EPA's unwillingness to press the idea in the face
of such resistance. The GAO reported that a formal system would be "both controversial and difficult to
implement."116 A 2000 report concluded that differential oversight has stalled because
states resisted any formal ranking of their performance, so EPA backed down. EPA and ECOS did agree
[33 ELR 10574] on core measures that might allow comparison of state performance, but many states
refused to report all measures, and EPA has decided not to assemble—even at the regional-office
level—the data that could make such comparisons possible.117
NAPA itself, which championed the idea as noted above, now favors a less structured approach.118
If EPA is serious about embracing the rhetoric of performance-based management, differential oversight is a concept
on which it should stand firm. In fact, EPA regional offices have traditionally carried out some type of differential
oversight informally, and continue to do so, with buy-in from their states. Both Region 1 and Region 8, for example,
reported in interviews that they tailor the number of federal inspections or conduct more intensive reviews of files or
inspection reports based on the performance of their states. A 1995 study by the Environmental Law Institute reported
that Region 5 had implemented a differential oversight scheme for RCRA and the CWA in which reporting
requirements and real-time permit reviews were reduced based on the quality of state performance.119
What incentives would be appropriate for superior performing states? One way for EPA to reduce its oversight role
would be to conduct less frequent audits of state performance, or to only conduct limited, programwide, after-the-fact
reviews, rather than "real-time" or case-by-case review of permits or enforcement actions.120 Thus, for example, EPA
would not review state-drafted CWA permits before they are issued (a practice the CWA authorizes but that states find
irritating),121 or conduct oversight inspections of facilities that the state has inspected (or require joint EPA/state
inspections), or review individual enforcement cases to determine if the penalties assessed are adequate. This type of
programmatic rather than case-specific review is specifically contemplated by NEPPS, and various PPAs negotiated to
date sound the same theme (although these have not been limited to better performing states). In carrying this out, EPA
should take care to reduce its oversight only in those specific areas in which the state is performing well. EPA could
also agree to refrain from any overfilings in the state for a given period—a source of continual friction with the states
(see discussion below). EPA could also relieve states of some of their traditional reporting requirements.
In exceptionally performing states, EPA should take steps to liberate the states from some of the strictures of EPA's
traditional enforcement policies and the Policy Framework. Thus, for instance, regional offices would no longer insist
on a given frequency of inspections, i.e., all major air permit holders be inspected every year, or a given stringency of
inspections, i.e., that level 1 or level 2 inspections—the most comprehensive type—be carried out at the facilities.
Likewise, EPA could reduce or make more flexible state reporting obligations about adherence to EPA's "timely and
appropriate" enforcement policy, or its penalty policies (in practice many states don't adhere to these policies, but not
with EPA's blessing). States bridle at many of EPA's reporting requirements and what they view as the inflexibility of
EPA's enforcement policies, so they should welcome the prospect of these carrots.
Moreover, EPA should use the carrot of performance partnership grants (PPGs)—the more flexible funding approach
created by NEPPS that consolidates up to 16 categorical grants into a single grant—to reward better performing states.

PPGs weaken EPA's influence over state enforcement activities because they deprive EPA of the ability to track
program-specific expenditures; some EPA program managers believe that the flexibility inherent in the PPGs allows
states to deviate from EPA's national media-specific priorities.122 Presently, EPA offers PPGs to all states, despite the
level of state performance; 33 states currently receive PPGs, EPA instead should award PPGs only to better performing
states, and limit states with poor performance to traditional grants.123
Conversely, poorer performing states should receive relatively more intensive oversight, particularly in those areas in
which they are not doing well. This can include more EPA capacity building for state agency staff, such as training and
other assistance. It should also include case-by-case review of activity, such as individual reviews of permits, less
flexibility for state priority setting, and less leeway for departure from EPA enforcement policies. It should also include
less latitude in federal funding. Of course, these sanctions are likely to be ardently resisted by states. This is especially
true since in the view of most (if not all) states, NEPPS was supposed to lead to more lax, rather than heightened,
oversight of their activities.
Perhaps the most potent driver in a system of differential oversight would be the public attention it draws to poorer
performing states (as we argue below, the results of EPA's performance reviews should be made available to the
public). Beyond simply publicizing its evaluations, EPA also should provide some special positive recognition of
strong performers.
EPA Evaluation of State Performance Should Be Publicly Disclosed
A central lesson of the past quarter century plus is that while EPA has made some progress in promoting better state
adherence to EPA enforcement policies, its leverage with [33 ELR 10575] states is limited. Thus, key to EPA's efforts
to ensure adequate state performance is establishing a public spotlight to facilitate public scrutiny of state performance.
Although this would be a marked departure from EPA's traditional strategies for addressing deficiencies in enforcement
performance, it clearly would be consistent with rhetoric from public officials of all political allegiances.124
A spotlight approach is desirable for numerous reasons. First, spotlighting and other information disclosure strategies
enjoy broad support across the political spectrum, in part because of the diverse rationales which underlie them.
Consumer and environmental advocates favor more information as a right, as well as a tool, that enables individuals to
protest and protect their interests. Economists prefer such laws over direct government regulation because they rely on
the efficiency and power of market forces.125 Prof. Cass R. Sunstein has stated that "informational regulation, or
regulation through disclosure, has become one of the most striking developments in the last generation of American
law."126 EPA has identified expanding public access to environmental information as one of the Agency's 10 strategic
long-term goals.127
Equally important, information disclosure approaches have proven to be very effective. The most prominent example is
the federal toxics release inventory (TRI) program of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act
(EPCRA). TRI requires manufacturing and certain other industrial facilities to annually disclose their releases and
transfers of 654 specified toxic chemicals, subject to reporting thresholds. The information is provided on standardized
reporting forms that are submitted to EPA and state officials. EPA is required to make the information available to the
public through a national computerized database accessible through personal computers. From 1988 to 2000, reported
toxic releases dropped by 48%.128 Moreover, releases of some chemicals that may pose particularly significant human
threats, i.e., carcinogens, declined at a faster rate than other releases. EPA officials, as well as environmentalists and
regulated entities, regularly tout TRI as one of the nation's most effective environmental laws. As Prof. Bradley
Karkkainen explains, TRI works because "[firms] are subjected to the scrutiny of a variety of external parties,
including investors, community residents, and regulators, any of whom may desire improved environmental
performance and exert powerful pressures on poor performers to upgrade their performance as measured by the TRI
yardstick."129 He further notes the motivating influence of comparative performance data: "Because TRI data allow
easy comparisons among facilities, firms, and industries, a poor environmental performance record as reflected in TRI
data can cause reputational damage, potentially affecting relations with customers, suppliers, employees, or investors."

Likewise, California's Proposition 65, which requires warnings prior to exposures to listed carcinogens and
reproductive toxins, has led to the elimination or reduction of toxics in numerous consumer products, such as
ceramicware, nail polish removers, lead foil caps on wine bottles, submersible well water pumps, brass faucets,
calcium supplements, and hair dyes.130 It also has prompted reductions in air emissions of certain toxic chemicals of
approximately 85%.131
EPA also has reported positive results from its Sector Facility Indexing Project (SFIP), which provides public access to
detailed environmental profiles, including compliance histories, on approximately 650 facilities in 5 major industrial
sectors. In addition to finding that there was a significant public interest and demand for compliance-related
information, EPA noted that public disclosure created healthy incentives for improving data quality.132 Among other
things, disclosure led to greater consistency in reporting of particular types of information and correction of data
processing errors.133
Also related to the enforcement context, research has shown that public disclosure of environmental performance can
create strong incentives for pollution control and compliance. For example, several studies have demonstrated
reductions in the stock price of poor environmental performers when information about their performance is released,
including information about their compliance status.134 Likewise, a program in which the Indonesian Environmental
Ministry evaluated and publicly reported the environmental performance of regulated parties prompted substantial
improvements in facility compliance. A study of compliance and emission levels by pulp and paper firms in British
Columbia from 1990 through 1996 found significant improvements in compliance and emission reductions from public
disclosure of firms' environmental performance. One recent evaluation of disclosure strategies used throughout the
world concludes that such strategies "can be effective in motivating environmental improvement."135
The same forces that have made public disclosure effective at stimulating improvements by regulated
entities can work to trigger better performance by government agencies. As Prof. Shelley Metzenbaum has
persuasively argued, public comparison and evaluation has great power to embarrass and motivate
environmental agencies, just as comparison [33 ELR 10576] shopping by the public drives companies to
offer better products. She writes:
The potential for embarrassment (and its converse, the possibility of earning honor and distinction) can be
a powerful performance incentive. When Florida's environmental agency started to publish comparative
compliance rates for each of its regional offices, the compliance rates for one region was [sic] going to be
significantly worse than that of the others. The region housed very few regulated facilities and one of those
facilities had been out of compliance for years. The facility's environmental staff had unsuccessfully
petitioned their management in the past to secure the funds they needed to correct the compliance problem.
As soon as the facility managers learned their compliance problem was going to be apparent to the public,
they fixed the problem.136
In a similar vein, EPA's Inspector General concluded in a 2001 audit that evaluations of state programs by
EPA Regions should be made easily accessible to the public. The audit noted that
publicity apparently caused North Carolina to improve its storm water program. Although EPA's Region
4's evaluation of North Carolina's enforcement program in 1999 found serious deficiencies in management
of the storm water program, the state did not agree to make investments in the program until we reported
these same problems a year later.137
Likewise, in the Clean Charles Initiative, described above, a public spotlight on performance also helped lead to
improvements in compliance and water quality. At the start of the initiative, EPA's regional administrator presented the
Region's first "report card" on the health of the river (it received a "D," since it met only met swimming standards 19%
of the time and boating standards 39% of the time). The Region issued report cards each of the next several years
thereafter, and EPA and state officials report that the report card "may have been the single most important factor in the
initiative's success."138 By 1999, the river met boating standards 90% of the time and swimming standards 65% of the

time. (The initiative, it should be noted, also relied on a combination of targeted enforcement, targeted compliance
assistance, state funding for infrastructure improvement, and voluntary agreements with local communities.)
Public scrutiny also led Florida in the mid-1990s to invest considerable resources in developing
performance measures:
Florida officials … told us [the GAO] that the number of penalties assessed, and dollar value of penalties
collected, under its federally delegated programs decreased from 1994 to 1996, and that questions were
raised as to whether these decreases resulted, at least in part, from a greater emphasis on the use of
assistance to achieve compliance. In fact, newspapers in the state subsequently published articles
questioning whether the state was letting violators continue to pollute without fear of punishment. Florida
officials told us that their major investment in measuring the results of their enforcement and compliance
assistance efforts was undertaken, in part, to determine whether these concerns were well-founded.139
Indeed, a spotlight approach underlies the citizen submission process established in 1994 by the environmental side
agreement of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Under Article 14 of the side agreement, any
citizen or nongovernmental organization in Canada, Mexico and the United States (the treaty's signatories) can file a
submission alleging that a Member country is failing to enforce its environmental laws effectively. If certain criteria are
satisfied, the agency implementing the agreement known as the North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (NACEC) will prepare a "factual record" about the country's environmental practices at issue, which can
include information submitted by interested environmental groups, the country involved, and experts, and which will
be made public upon a vote by the NACEC. That is the end of the process—it does not provide for sanctions or
directions to the government involved to change its enforcement practices. The underlying idea is that domestic
environmental enforcement in the Member states will be enhanced by an international spotlight on such practices, that
public scrutiny will motivate the three countries involved to maintain or enhance their enforcement efforts.140 As one
distinguished group of reviewers has put it, the process makes it possible for "some 350 million pairs of eyes to alert
the [NACEC] of any 'race to the bottom' through lax environmental enforcement."141
Nonetheless, spotlighting is likely to be resisted by states. Government officials sensitive about their performance are
not likely to jump at the prospect of having such performance made easily accessible to the public, or to being "graded"
based on such performance. The concerns many states expressed regarding EPA's SFIP initiative, and their urging a
go-slow approach for this initiative on a variety of grounds, likely is the harbinger of their reaction to any effort to
spotlight enforcement and compliance practices.142 It is a natural human tendency to prefer not to be judged and have
one's "warts" placed in the public spotlight. Certainly efforts to report on performance to date have not been marked by
their self-critical nature. (EPA's annual Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Accomplishments Reports, to take one
example, have often painted a glowing picture of EPA and state enforcement efforts, overlooking evidence of persistent
deficiencies in state performance.)143
Likewise, states will contend that efforts to grade and compare their performance are oversimplified and
misleading—that current performance measures do not accurately capture the effectiveness of their enforcement and
compliance programs; success is determined by matters outside of [33 ELR 10577] their control; and that evaluative
criteria are not comparable across states. There is some justification to these arguments, but the solution is not to keep
data about state performance private. Rather, greater government accountability can only come with public disclosure
of how well states are performing, based on the state of the art of performance measures, delivered with the appropriate
caveats. Some oversimplification is inherent, but to withhold the information presumes the public is less capable of
carefully and appropriately evaluating information than state or EPA officials.
Moreover, the enhanced public attention on evaluation measures which the states believe are inadequate will itself
generate pressure to enhance performance measures, as the example from Florida discussed above illustrates. At
bottom, we believe, opponents of spotlighting are fighting a movement for public accountability that is pervasive in
society.

One question that arises is whether or not state performance should be publicly graded or ranked. There certainly is a
strong argument for this. As noted by Professor Metzenbaum, comparison can be a very powerful motivator.
Indonesia's rating program was very successful, especially concerning plants that were rated as below average, and it
has led several other countries to similar programs, including Columbia, Mexico, and the Philippines.144 The TRI
program has been quite effective without any governmental gloss on the data, although the nature of the data disclosed
—volume of releases by facility—lends itself to ready comparisons.
On the other hand, some may argue that numerical rankings or grades are inevitably misleading or overly simplistic,
and there is some truth to that. Moreover, some EPA officials believe that publicly ranking states could impair their
ability to maintain a cooperative working relationship with the states. Thus, EPA may simply want to report or provide
information and leave it to public interest organizations to create scorecards or variations on such a theme. This is
similar to the charts prepared by Region 4, discussed above, which provide comparative information about how states
are meeting the core performance measures developed under NEPPS. As another alternative, EPA could simply list the
best performing and worst performing states in a Region in a given year, without ranking the remainder.
EPA Should Maintain Withdrawal of State Program Authorizations as a Credible Option
EPA always has the option of using its "ultimate sanction" of withdrawing a state's authorization if it determines that a
state's performance falls too far below acceptable levels. This threat is more theoretical than real, however, since EPA
has never fully withdrawn a state environmental program, and probably is unlikely to do so in the near future.
Nonetheless, the possibility of withdrawal remains a potent tool which EPA has wielded with some limited success in
recent years, and it can be strengthened by providing for enforceable time frames for EPA to act on citizen withdrawal
petitions.
The substantive criteria governing withdrawal are laid out in each statute and its implementing regulations, as well as
in EPA/state operating agreements or delegation documents. They generally provide that EPA can withdraw approval
of state programs if any of various aspects of the state programs "do not meet" federal requirements, including the
state's legal authorities, permitting program, public participation requirements, or enforcement program. With respect
to enforcement, for example, RCRA provides that grounds for withdrawal include failure to act on violations, failure to
seek adequate enforcement penalties or collect fines that have been imposed, or failure to inspect and monitor
regulated facilities.145 EPA seemingly has considerable discretion in determining the adequacy of state performance.146
The procedures for withdrawal are quite involved. For example, under RCRA, EPA is required to prepare written
findings, hold an adjudicatory hearing and provide a 90-day grace period for correcting identified deficiencies.147 The
procedures under the CWA are comparable.148 Indeed, EPA's recent review of a set of withdrawal petitions filed by
citizen groups in Ohio illustrates the length and complexity of the process. The petitions were filed and then amended
over the course of a three-year period, and raise a host of alleged flaws in programs under several statutes administered
by Ohio EPA. After dismissing the earlier claims relating to Ohio's audit privilege and immunity law, Region 5 spent
close to two years investigating the other allegations, and issued an over 200-page draft report in August 2001. Region
5 then convened a series of public hearings, and provided for a public comment period of close to six months. It then
took the matter under submission for another year, before denying the petitions in February 2003. All of this activity
precedes any formal hearing, if EPA decides to initiate withdrawal proceedings. Professor Rodgers has opined that "the
procedures for withdrawal of state programs would be suitable for the Nuremberg trials, and will be invoked only upon
epochal occasions."149
EPA has rarely if ever actually withdrawn a state's authorization (although as noted above, it did quasi-revoke
Maryland's Title V authority in 2001). It has initiated withdrawal proceedings on a number of occasions. For example,
in the early 1990s, it started formal actions to withdraw primacy for eight state SDWA programs (but never carried
through with any of them).150 Similarly, as discussed above, in 1987, EPA sought to revoke authority for North
Carolina's RCRA program. The administrative law judge hearing the matter determined that withdrawal was not
warranted, a conclusion adopted by EPA's Regional Administrator (and subsequently [33 ELR 10578] upheld by the
court of appeals).151 EPA has also threatened withdrawal of state programs in a number of additional instances.

Probably its most serious threats came in the mid-1990s, when it initiated withdrawal proceedings in several states
because of concerns about audit privilege and immunity laws.152 During this period EPA also held up granting some
states authorization to implement new environmental programs (such as the permitting program under Title V of the
CAA) pending changes in their audit laws, and also warned some states that it might withhold federal enforcement
grants.153 EPA also threatened to withdraw Rhode Island's water pollution permitting authority in 1997 unless the state
restored cuts to its environmental budget.154
EPA's reluctance to withdraw state programs is explainable by two primary factors. The first is money: EPA has stated
that it lacks the resources to take over previously authorized state programs. For example, former EPA Administrator
Carol Browner testified in 1993 that "there are some States that have seriously considered returning primacy to the
Federal government. I will be very honest with you, we don't have the resources to manage even one major State if
primacy were to be returned."155 Another EPA official opined that "even if only a small number of delegated states
returned their programs to EPA, [EPA's] enforcement program would not be able to cope with the new responsibilities.
Ultimately, there would be less enforcement, not more."156 Other commentators agree, one noting that "when there is
friction between the federal EPA and a state over the administration of an approved program, the federal government's
threat to revoke the state's approval may be more than balanced by the state's threat to return the program to the federal
government."157
On the other hand, not all observers think this is true. For instance, after talking with numerous officials in all of EPA's
programs, NAPA staff concluded that EPA has sufficient national capacity to operate nondelegated programs centrally.
It suggested that EPA could consolidate the expertise of its regional staff and create specialized teams capable of taking
over poorly performing state programs.158 It may be that as some states continue to mature and perform better, EPA
could reduce its resources devoted to oversight and free up other resources. Moreover, in our view a key question is not
whether EPA can administer a significant number of state programs, but rather whether it has the resources to take over
even one or two states, since even a very occasional program withdrawal could have a notable impact on state
performance.
The second roadblock to withdrawal is politics; withdrawal is a highly charged, politically difficult endeavor. The
move toward devolution has made the political calculus of withdrawal even more improbable. Indeed, as noted above,
the only apparent instance in which EPA went through the formal administrative hearing process for withdrawing an
authorized state program is when it sought to revoke authority for North Carolina's RCRA program. In that case,
notably, the basis of withdrawal was not deficiencies in state performance, but rather that the state program imposed
unduly stringent requirements for the siting of new hazardous waste facilities. The withdrawal petition was filed by a
hazardous waste facility owner and a hazardous waste trade group. EPA's Regional Administrator ultimately decided
not to withdraw North Carolina's RCRA authorization.159 Professor Rodgers argues that "the case confirms that
program withdrawal is a remedy strictly confined to unusual legal pathologies."160
While recognizing the political limitations of withdrawal, we think it still can be employed as an effective tool. EPA
need only act in a few states to have a significant deterrent effect; moreover, EPA can chose to withdraw only part of a
state program that it has authorized. Notably, one of EPA's sister agencies, the Office of Surface Mining, did muster the
political will to reassume control of the surface mining programs in two states because of poor state performance.161
EPA's threats over state audit privilege and immunity laws in the 1990s were perceived as credible and, despite
protests, triggered changes in virtually all of the state laws that EPA found objectionable. As noted above, in 2001 EPA
withdrew (at least on paper) Maryland's air permitting program, an action that led the state in 2002 to revise its
problematic law on standing to challenge permits.
Even an announcement of a formal policy of revisiting states' legal authorities, capacity, and enforcement performance
may prompt improved performance. A withdrawal proceeding is embarrassing to state officials. It represents a public
statement by EPA that the state's program is entirely inadequate. The prospect of being branded in this way might well
serve as strong motivation to state officials. Further, a withdrawal threat or proceeding might enlist strange bedfellows
within at-risk states in the common cause of improving state capacity and performance. Such a proceeding is likely to
send an alarm signal to members of the regulated community, who are likely to prefer the "devil they know." State

environmental [33 ELR 10579] organizations are likely to recognize that such an EPA initiative is an opportunity to
make the case that something is seriously amiss in their state and to win political support for invigorating the state
infrastructure. Possibly this sort of strong medicine from an outsider, the federal government, may serve as a focal
point for disparate statebased forces to coalesce in favor of enhancing state capacity, even if their motivations for
supporting such an upgrade may differ.
The improbability of program withdrawal in most instances, however, highlights the need for more graduated sanctions
for poor performing states. As Professor Metzenbaum notes, "if EPA can only threaten withdrawal of delegation
authority for poor state performance, a state is likely to treat the threat with some skepticism."162
One option slightly less onerous than program withdrawal is for EPA to take over a state's entire enforcement function.
Such federal "assumption of enforcement" is provided for by both the CWA and the CAA, whereby violations of
permits or requirements of CAA state implementation plans (SIPs) are so widespread that they appear to result "from a
failure of the State to enforce" effectively.163 After giving a state 30 days' notice of such failure (90 days in the case of
Title V permit violations under the CAA), EPA is authorized to enforce any permit condition or SIP requirement with
respect to any person by issuing a compliance order or bringing an enforcement action. While in theory less intrusive
than complete program withdrawal, in practice the same political and resource constraints limiting program withdrawal
also make significant use of this option unrealistic.164
More realistic options include those discussed in the section above on differential oversight. EPA should audit more
permits, inspections, and enforcement actions in weaker states. Poor performing states also should have enhanced
real-time permit reviews, closer examination of priority setting, and increases in federal inspections and direct
enforcement activity. They should also have less flexibility in obtaining federal funding. (As an aside, we note that the
OECA's ability to encourage desired state performance through financial incentives is hampered by the fact that it
generally does not have control of the purse strings for grants to states. Rather, funding is controlled by the various,
media-specific program offices at EPA (air, water, solid waste pesticides and toxic substances, among others), from
which the OECA is organizationally distinct. It would be helpful if EPA program officials responsible for funding
receive significant input from enforcement staff, and pertinent recommendations for improving state enforcement
performance are made part of a state's grant conditions.)
EPA also can work more intensively with states that are deficient to help them meet necessary requirements. One
option that EPA does not currently take full advantage of involves upgrading the Agency's contacts with state attorneys
general, or in some states, state auditors. EPA contacts with states tend to rely on the state environmental agency as the
hub, at least based on our experience. In most states, the attorney general is an independently elected official. An
attorney general in a state that EPA believes is lax on enforcement potentially has much to gain from "being part of the
solution" of enhancing such enforcement. Such an attorney general can point to EPA concerns about the lack of
enforcement and take the position that his/her office is taking action to ensure that pollution does not pay. Further, such
an attorney general can minimize criticism associated with taking an aggressive stance on enforcement by suggesting
that his/her office will keep the federal government out and thereby produce better, home-grown solutions to the state's
environmental problems. On the other hand, because of the potential political sensitivity of such contacts (especially
where the attorney general and governor are from different political parties), EPA may be reluctant to pursue this
approach very often.
Finally, we believe that reshaping the withdrawal process could result in additional pressure for improved state
performance. In particular, current rules set forth time frames for the resolution of withdrawal actions once commenced
by EPA, but not for a determination by EPA about whether to accept or reject a citizen withdrawal petition.165 We
believe that EPA should be required to investigate and issue a determination about whether it will take action based on
citizen petitions within a specified time frame. Such final agency actions (including failures to act) then would be
subject to judicial review. This is different from the current situation, in which petitions can, and often do, languish
indefinitely within the agency, with the petitioners being powerless to do anything to expedite action. We also think
that it is worth exploring the feasibility of allowing greater citizen participation in the investigative process that EPA
initiates in response to citizen withdrawal petitions. For example, it is worth considering whether, assuming certain

thresholds for a citizen petition are met, e.g., EPA determines that a petition raises meritorious allegations of
inadequate state performance, the citizen petitioners should be allowed to supplement EPA's investigation by
requesting information from, interviewing, or otherwise engaging state agency officials, whose practices are at issue.
The practicalities of this proposal need to be further examined, but just as citizen enforcement of environmental laws
has proven to be a useful adjunct to government enforcement, we believe that greater citizen involvement has the
potential to invigorate the withdrawal process. In particular, citizen groups may be more forceful in investigating poor
state performance than EPA, especially since withdrawal petitions are investigated by EPA's regional offices, with
whom states often enjoy close relationships.
EPA Should Enhance Enforcement in Authorized States
EPA's own resources, albeit limited, give it another tool to influence state behavior. First, EPA can take steps to
enhance [33 ELR 10580] the capacity of state programs. Second, EPA should strategically use its own enforcement
resources to bolster weak state programs. With regard to the latter option, EPA can expand its own direct enforcement
role by more systematically dividing enforcement responsibilities with the various states. Alternatively, EPA can
increase the number of "overfilings" and other enforcement actions in states that are not performing to EPA
expectations. These are discussed in turn.
EPA Should Take Steps to Enhance the Capacity of State Programs
One important carrot EPA can offer to improve state performance is assistance in building the capacity of state
programs. If a state, for example, needs instruction in conducting certain types of inspections, EPA can arrange for
state inspectors to be trained in the proper techniques. In FY 2000, the OECA reported that it conducted 463 training
courses, made over 6,700 regulatory determinations, responded to 1,527 requests for assistance, and conducted 1,132
assisted inspections, in order to help states, tribes, and localities build capacity. Likewise, EPA can provide analytic
support to the states to identify patterns of noncompliance and suggest the best means for targeting their enforcement
efforts. As one illustration, EPA reported that in FY 2001, it responded to 10,000 queries per month from state (and
tribal) agencies seeking to use the Agency's specialized tracking system for identifying patterns of noncompliance by
industry sector, geographic area, and statute.166 As EPA continues to transfer more of the primary authority for
implementing its programs to the states, it should be able to shift more of its program staff from direct implementation
to state capacity building. The capacity-building activities initiated by EPA's Region 8, discussed above, are the type
that should be part of EPA's efforts systematically to identify state needs and tailor EPA support accordingly. They
should be an integral part of the differential oversight scheme discussed above.
EPA Should Divide the Enforcement/Compliance Universe More Systematically With States
Even in states that have received program authorization from EPA, EPA files some of its own, direct enforcement
actions. Critics charge, however, that these actions are not as strategic or as well-coordinated with the states as they
should be. NEPPS contemplates that EPA and individual states will engage in joint planning and priority setting.167 It
further appears to contemplate the possibility of an active EPA enforcement presence.168 The idea is that the Regions
and states will mutually determine their priorities and the resources available, and then divide responsibilities
accordingly. The 1994 Joint Policy Statement on State/EPA Relations likewise reflects an intent to "utilize the
comparative advantages and inherent strengths that each party brings to the relationship."169 As part of joint planning
efforts, EPA Regions and states could agree to divide enforcement responsibilities in various ways. EPA, for instance,
might take on some or all of the regulated parties in a state under a particular program.170
Coordinated action based on mutually agreed-upon priorities is likely to work better in advancing environmental
protection than is uncoordinated, ad hoc action that fails to target priority concerns. Further, each sovereign could
choose those responsibilities it is most committed to fulfilling and for which it is best suited.
In deciding how best to divide the enforcement pie between them, states and EPA Regions would need to determine,
among other things: (1) the key priority areas, e.g., industries in which levels of noncompliance are unacceptably high
and in which violating sources are causing significant, adverse environmental impacts; (2) the interest and capacity of

EPA and the relevant state in addressing the particular areas of concern, e.g., the number of inspectors compared to the
size of the regulated party universe, the number of lawyers available to bring cases, etc.; (3) strategic considerations
that might favor federal or state primacy in particular situations, e.g., the value of reserving EPA for a "gorilla in the
closet"—type role that the state could use to leverage appropriate settlements; and (4) the need for federal resources to
make up for shortfalls in state performance (if EPA believes that it is important to physically inspect 100 facilities in a
particular state one year, and the state only is comfortable committing to inspect 75, EPA can use its own staff to
inspect the remaining 25). As a general matter, certain types of cases seem particularly appropriate for direct EPA
enforcement—cases where it is important to establish a national precedent; against an entire industrial sector; cases
against a single defendant with facilities in multiple states; or cases that are especially complex or resourceintensive.171
As with the option of program withdrawal, there are real practical and political constraints to the above
strategy. For one, EPA may lack the resources to do direct enforcement on a wide scale. Second, while
some states may embrace an enhanced EPA presence as a means of alleviating enforcement resource
constraints, many others may view any direct federal enforcement presence as undercutting the sacrosanct
[33 ELR 10581] notion of state primacy. One state official testified that "when EPA brings a direct
enforcement action in a state, there is often concern that the principle setting forth the primary role of the
state has been violated."172 Prof. Robert Kuehn captured the more recent mood of many states when he
wrote that
environmental enforcement's gorilla is facing extinction or, perhaps more accurately, execution or
starvation …. Federal environmental agencies find themselves subject to increasing calls to reduce
dramatically, or even eliminate, their enforcement roles. Once seen as a gorilla in the closet whose
threatened release could persuade violators to comply with the law, many politicians and commentators
now view federal enforcement as an unwarranted intrusion into the efforts of capable state enforcement
agencies.173
Nonetheless, EPA needs to maintain a direct enforcement capacity in authorized states, and it needs systematically to
use it to address what it considers to be the most significant enforcement needs that otherwise will not be handled
effectively by the states.
EPA Should Continue to Overfile Strategically
Overfiling refers to the filing of a suit by EPA against an alleged violator even though the state already has initiated its
own enforcement action against the party alleging the same violations. EPA initiates such actions when in its view the
state action constitutes an inadequate enforcement response, such as "where the state response to a violator or
environmental condition fails to protect human health or the environment, fails to deter future violations by a major
repeat violator, or fails to protect law abiding facilities from competitive disadvantage."174 We believe that the strategic
use of overfilings is an important oversight tool that EPA should continue to employ. As one detailed analysis of the
practice concludes, "overfiling provides the EPA with a realistic way to nip at the heels of the states to properly
implement federal prerogatives."175
While the record of state performance indicates that EPA has had ample opportunity for overfilings,176
EPA only rarely overfiles, as former EPA Assistant Administrator Steven Herman made clear in his June
1997, congressional testimony:
Statistics show that overfiling is in fact a rare event. As reported by a state-by-state survey conducted by
ECOS, the Agency overfiled on about 30 cases or 0.3% of all federal enforcement action during [FY] 1992
through [FY] 1994. During [FY] 1994 and [FY] 1995, the Agency overfiled on a total of 18 cases or about
0.1% of state enforcement cases. From October 1995 through September 1996, there was a total of four
overfiling cases.177
In approximately the first two years of the Bush Administration, EPA overfiled in three instances.178

There are many reasons for the reality of few overfilings. "Double-teaming" violators is problematic from
a government resources perspective. Further, overfilings create a basic "fairness" issue from the
perspective of the regulated community. Moreover, overfilings, by their very nature, place considerable
stress on the notion of a strong EPA/state partnership. They represent a clear federal rebuke of state
performance and therefore are embarrassing to the states. Oklahoma Executive Director Mark Coleman's
June 1997, congressional testimony captures states' distaste for federal overfiling practices:
Although the instances of EPA overfiling are relatively few, the possibility of overfiling and the use of
overfiling comes at a great cost. The potential for overfiling leads to mutual wariness and if not done with
extreme care it can rapidly damage the enforcement relationship.179
Indeed, even a very few overfilings provoke strong state opposition. In Utah, as a result of three overfilings within a
two-year period, a nonbinding resolution was introduced in 1999 in the legislature calling on Congress to investigate
EPA overfiling because of its adverse impact on "working relationships between the EPA and the states."180 A
resolution adopted by ECOS in October 1998, calls for overfiling to be limited to a narrow set of circumstances that do
not include a state obtaining an insufficient penalty, no matter how inadequate.181 A final factor potentially impacting
[33 ELR 10582] EPA's use of overfilings is the preference evinced by NEPPS for programmatic, rather than
case-specific, reviews. If this type of review becomes more of the norm in all states, even poorer performing states, it
will be harder for EPA to learn of specific enforcement actions in which it should overfile.
However politically challenging, we believe that there are advantages to greater use of overfilings. First, overfilings are
a far more strategic and less intrusive and resource-intensive form of intervention than wholesale program withdrawal.
Indeed, before overfiling EPA must give the state and the violator adequate notice, a requirement that two state
officials argue has "the practical effect of [providing] more state control over enforcement actions."182 (Under the CAA
and the CWA, EPA is required to notify both the violator and the state at least 30 days before overfiling. RCRA
requires advance notice but does not specify the number of days.)183
Second, overfilings can be quite effective. Being sued once for a set of alleged violations is not particularly pleasant.
Ending up on the receiving end of a second lawsuit aimed at the same set of violations is likely to raise the anxiety
level of the alleged violator. Overfilings thus are likely to get the attention of the regulated community very quickly
and have a ripple effect extending well beyond the particular alleged violators targeted, particularly since EPA's penalty
demands are likely to be much higher than those of the state. State enforcers may be able to more credibly pursue
higher sanctions to avoid the prospect of multiple suits. Overfilings can be a particularly effective check on local
political (or other) pressures that lead to weak state enforcement practices or sweetheart settlements. One example is
the well-publicized EPA overfiling in 1996 against Smithfield Foods in which EPA acted after Virginia failed to assess
meaningful penalties for over 5,000 violations by Smithfield of its permit. In that case, Smithfield was contributing to
the governor's political action committee, and also repeatedly threatened to leave Virginia if state regulators were too
strict.184 EPA audits have cited other instances in which state and local agencies acknowledged that they were reluctant
to take strong enforcement actions because of fear that companies might close or chose to relocate elsewhere.185
Finally, because overfilings are anathema to states, an EPA policy to overfile strategically may lead states to upgrade
their efforts in order to limit EPA "interference." Some states may reassess their own practices to respond to inevitable
pressure from regulated parties concerned about the emergence from the closet of an EPA gorilla that is much more
fearsome than the state enforcement arm, or their concern about embarrassment due to public attention, including from
environmental nongovernmental organizations galvanized to focus on states' performance in this area. An EPA
overfiling, and even more likely a public EPA decision to overfile in specified states on a regular basis because of
purported deficiencies in state enforcement practices, is likely to place a spotlight on such practices.
Conclusion
Because EPA's traditional methods of oversight have left a sizeable gap between state enforcement performance and
EPA expectations, new oversight approaches are needed. This Article outlines a number of ideas for improving state

performance and making the federal/state relationship more effective. These recommendations can work regardless of
whether the "governing document" for the EPA/state enforcement relationship is NEPPS, the traditional Policy
Framework, or some combination of the two. Some of the recommendations explicitly build on the themes embraced
by NEPPS; others draw on more traditional oversight tools, including ones that have not been used with great
effectiveness in the past. The underlying theme to many of these is greater state accountability, both to EPA and to the
public, starting at the initial authorization or gatekeeping stage, extending through regular reviews of state performance
and a system of differential oversight, to enhanced oversight and engagement by the public through a spotlighting
approach. In our view, the lack of accountability has been a significant shortcoming in the state/EPA relationship to
date, and we strongly endorse greater reliance on a "spotlight" strategy.186 In this age of increasing accountability, it is
time for EPA and the states to make themselves publicly accountable for their enforcement performance.
Many of these options are likely to face considerable political resistance, particularly in the current political climate,
because some might be inclined to characterize them as casting EPA in more of the traditional role of "overseer" of
state programs than as a true "partner" of the states. We do not minimize the concerns that this criticism raises or the
importance of EPA maintaining a cooperative relationship with the states to achieve the goals set forth by our
environmental statutes. But the approach we advocate is more likely to achieve better state performance because it
conditions the reward of full partnership upon honest achievement of EPA expectations. Indeed, well performing states
would be rewarded with even fuller partnership than is available under the current system. The privileges and benefits
of partnership should come only with increased accountability to EPA and its expectations.
None of the approaches outlined in this Article is likely to be a silver bullet. In the absence of experimentation with
them, however, the gap between expectation and performance is likely to widen, particularly in a political landscape
heavily tilted toward devolution of authority to the states.
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